Finland is currently updating its 2024 foreign and security policy report, with the update intended to be released after Easter. The background for the update is a changed security environment, and the most interesting part will concern the future of Finland's relations with Russia. A draft section states that Russia has remained largely isolated by the West and subject to extensive sanctions during its war of aggression, European and other Western partners' unity in isolating Russia has held with some exceptions, and the EU has been able to respond to Russia's actions. Finland is examining the future of Russia relations together with its partners, and at some point the need to open political-level contacts must be examined, but there will be no return to the old bilateral relationship. Proactive monitoring of Russia's internal development and foreign and security policy will continue to require sufficient Russia expertise both in Finland and in Europe, though since the report has not yet been officially published, it is possible that changes will still be made.
Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 fundamentally altered the security landscape in Europe. On 24 February 2022 Russia initiated a full-fledged invasion of Ukraine, and Finland applied for NATO membership on 17 May 2022, received an official invitation on 5 July 2022, and became a full member on 4 April 2023. According to Finnish officials, Finland's decision to join NATO was influenced by Russia's brutal violation of the international order, including the UN Charter. This shift has reshaped regional dynamics, with Finland now sharing a common border with Russia of 1,340 km.
Historical context shows that since the start of Putin's third presidential term in 2012, geopolitical competition has become rooted in the Nordic region, and small states' room for manoeuvre in security policy has shrunk. In Russia's view, maintaining 'good neighbourly relations' is primarily the responsibility of small states that always need to negotiate the limits of their sovereignty with great powers, such as Russia. Prior to 2014, Norway was often mentioned among Russia's 'good neighbours', but now Russia regularly calls off its policy of 'reassurance and deterrence'. In Russia's view, a 'good neighbour' should refrain from extensive security collaboration and training with NATO and the US, and Finland and Sweden cannot wholly avoid political tension with Russia merely by staying outside of NATO. After Putin's return to the presidency in 2012, the economy was increasingly seen as part of the wider geopolitical agenda, with rhetoric shifting to Russia's economic and political 'sovereignty'.
Current Russia-Finland relations are characterized by frozen cooperation and operational diplomacy. The original 2024 report stated that Russia's attack on Ukraine has fundamentally affected Finland's and Russia's bilateral relations, and Finland has refrained from political relations with Russia as the country blatantly violates international law and the UN Charter in its war of aggression. Bilateral official cooperation with Russia has been broadly frozen since February 2022, but diplomatic relations between the countries are operational, with official contact channels maintained in sectors essential for Finland such as border security, crime prevention cooperation, transport, and security of supply. Finland was placed by Moscow on the list of 'unfriendly countries', and in the Finnish political sphere, discussing and debating the Russian threat has traditionally been very restrained. Russia's internal development remains difficult to predict for a long time.
The background for the Russia relations update is the possibility that after the war, discussions about European security architecture will begin, including with Russia. Even if this is not desired, Finland must prepare for it, and Finland must also have a clear position that NATO's defense and deterrence are not on the table. This is a change from the original report, as the future of Finland's Russia relations was not really defined in it. The background for the current report includes many changes, one of which concerns changes in the United States, though specific details are not provided.
The core message in the current report will be that in the coming years Finland will have to endure continuous uncertainty, and it may come from unexpected directions. At the same time, Finland will use its own agency and take care of its own security, which is a description of Finland's operating environment. The update to be released after Easter consists of four themes: the near environment, transatlantic relations, the Middle East, and the global whole, though the detailed contents of these themes are not specified.
NATO coordination has been crucial for military aid to Ukraine. Through the Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List (PURL), NATO is coordinating the purchase of critical defence equipment from the United States by other NATO Allies. Allies have committed to funding USD 4 billion of military equipment sourced from the US via PURL, and deliveries are underway. NATO's Article 5 security guarantee provides Allies with the confidence that they can send weapons to Ukraine without diminishing their own security. Through NATO's Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP) and related funds, Allies have pledged over EUR 1.2 billion (approximately USD 1.4 billion) to meet Ukraine's critical needs for non-lethal aid.
European militarization is driven by a consensus that military investments present the only viable means of security among European NATO member states. A key assumption behind this wave of militarization is that a Russian victory in Ukraine could ultimately embolden Russia to attack the alliance. If Vladimir Putin can't win a clear victory in Ukraine, he will seek one elsewhere; a clear victory in Ukraine would embolden Moscow to further aggression.
Northern Europe faces high risks of escalation, with the risk of inadvertent escalation particularly high in Northern Europe, where related tensions and militarization have created destabilizing subregional dynamics. The Baltic Sea region has already seen several close encounters between NATO and Russian forces. The accession of Sweden and Finland as NATO's newest members has fundamentally altered Russia's security calculations in the Baltic and Nordic region.
Recent incidents highlight these tensions. In December 2024, Finnish authorities seized the tanker Eagle S on suspicion that it had damaged undersea cables linking Finland and Estonia. Other NATO states have also boarded and detained tankers on the basis of flag registration or insurance issues. Russia has characterized such actions as piracy and responded by offering military protection to the vessels in the form of naval escorts and air support. In May 2025, Russia intervened by flying an Su-35 fighter jet past the ship Jaguar, briefly entering Estonian airspace and prompting the scrambling of Portuguese jets.
Nuclear weapons policy is a key issue, with Finland saying it was planning to lift a longstanding ban on hosting nuclear weapons, in a move that could open the door to placing them there during times of war. According to Finnish President Alexander Stubb, Finland did not want a nuclear weapon on its territory but was aligning itself with the policy of its Nordic neighbours. Russia said it would respond if Finland placed nuclear weapons on its territory, saying such a move would make the Nordic country more vulnerable. Sweden's doctrine is to station no permanent foreign troops or nuclear weapons on its soil in peacetime, according to Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson, and the current status and timeline for Finland's plan to lift its ban are not specified.
Broader nuclear developments include France and Germany saying they had set up a nuclear steering group to discuss deterrence issues. Russia said Macron's announcement on expanding France's nuclear arsenal was an 'extremely destabilising development' that posed a potential threat to Moscow. Dmitry Peskov, the Kremlin spokesman, stated that this is a statement that leads to an escalation of tensions on the European continent.
Sweden and Finland joined NATO in 2023 and 2024 respectively, after Russia sent tens of thousands of soldiers into Ukraine. This accession has strategic implications for regional security, reinforcing NATO's presence in the Baltic area.
Potential Russian actions include the lowest risk option for Moscow—and therefore most likely—being Russian forces occupying Norway's Svalbard archipelago. This scenario aligns with fears of Russian expansion if emboldened by events in Ukraine.
Unknowns remain, including what specific changes will be made to the final version of Finland's updated foreign and security policy report compared to the draft, and when exactly after Easter it will be released. Additionally, what specific 'changes in the United States' are referenced as part of the background for Finland's current report update is unclear, and the detailed contents of the four themes in the upcoming report update have not been disclosed.