The Conflict Insights Group investigation used data obtained from tracking the mobile phones of the Colombian fighters, employing commercially available technology designed to make advertising more personal to track more than 50 mobile phones in Sudan between April 2025 and January this year whose operators were Colombian mercenaries, including at RSF-held areas from which drones were fired. It also used flight-tracking data, satellite imagery, social media videos, news and academic articles to support its analysis. According to Justin Lynch, director of the Conflict Insights Group, the report shows mercenaries involved with drones travelling from a UAE base to Sudan before the RSF takeover of el-Fasher. He noted that mercenaries involved in drone operations even named their wi-fi network their unit name - linked to a company operated out of the UAE.
The report says its data details a pipeline that showed the mercenaries present at various regional staging grounds, most significantly a UAE military training facility in Ghayathi in Abu Dhabi. It followed one phone from Colombia to Abu Dhabi's Zayad International Airport and then to the facility, where it also found four other devices configured to Spanish, which is spoken in Colombia. Two of those phones subsequently travelled to Sudan's South Darfur state and one to the de-facto RSF capital of Nyala, where it logged into wi-fi networks named 'ANTIAEREO' (meaning 'anti-aircraft' in Spanish) and 'AirDefense'. This evidence links mercenaries to UAE facilities and operations in Sudan, reinforcing the transnational nature of the network.
Colombian mercenaries have been recruited to fight in Sudan's civil war alongside the Rapid Support Forces, according to research from three sources. The recruitment of Colombian mercenaries involves a transnational network stretching from the Andes to Darfur, facilitated via WhatsApp and travel through the UAE, based on research from five sources. Colombian mercenaries traveled to Sudan via routes through UAE-loyalist eastern Libya and an airbase in Bosaso, Somalia housing Emirati military officials, as indicated by research from five sources. This network highlights the complex logistics behind the mercenary deployment.
Geolocation of footage places Colombian mercenaries at scenes of worst fighting in Darfur, according to research from five sources. A Colombian mercenary died within three months of arriving in Sudan in mid-2024 during the RSF campaign in Darfur, based on research from five sources. The RSF, supported by Colombian fighters, captured El-Fasher in October amid evidence of mass killings, abductions, and rape, according to the United States. A leaked operational order dated December 1, 2024, outlines the deployment of the Colombian 'Desert Wolves' battalion in El-Fasher, including use of white phosphorus and other munitions, as reported by research from five sources.
Financial incentives played a key role, with Colombian mercenaries paid $2,500 to $4,000 per month, up to six times their army pension, according to one former soldier. A retired Colombian colonel's former partner claims the mission aimed to place 2,500 men in the RSF's ranks, indicating the scale of recruitment. These payments and recruitment targets underscore the economic drivers behind the mercenary involvement.
The UAE has denied backing the RSF, with a senior official citing a pattern of disinformation. The UAE has previously issued statements rejecting what it called 'false and unfounded allegations' that it backs the RSF and condemning 'in the strongest terms' the atrocities committed in el-Fasher, according to the UAE government. The UAE has long denied supporting the RSF, which has been fighting Sudan's regular army for three years, as reported by major media. This denial contrasts with the evidence presented in the investigation.
International responses have included the U.S. sanctioning four Colombian nationals and their companies for their role in the transnational mercenary network on December 9, as announced by the U.S. government. The RSF has been accused by the U.S. government and British foreign secretary of genocide and systematic killings, torture, and sexual violence. The use of white phosphorus by mercenaries in civilian areas could constitute a war crime under international humanitarian law, according to research from five sources. These actions reflect growing international concern over the conflict's brutality.
A flat in London is linked to a transnational network recruiting Colombian mercenaries for the RSF, registered to Zeuz Global, a company set up by sanctioned individuals, based on research from five sources. Zeuz Global moved its address to central London on December 10, using postcodes of two hotels that deny any link to the company, as indicated by research from five sources. This London connection adds another layer to the global reach of the mercenary network.
In a broader Middle East context, a two-week ceasefire was announced on April 7, 2026, between the U.S. and Iran, brokered by Pakistan, conditional on opening the Strait of Hormuz, according to research from five sources. Operation Epic Fury, a coordinated US-Israeli offensive on February 28, killed Iran's Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, escalating conflict across the Middle East, as reported by research from five sources. The U.S. State Department issued a 'DEPART NOW' advisory for 16 Middle Eastern countries due to the escalating conflict. These events highlight the interconnected nature of regional conflicts.
Regional fallout included Dubai Airport being damaged by drone debris and closed for three days, stranding hundreds of thousands of passengers, based on research from five sources. The U.S. is sending charter flights to evacuate Americans from the UAE, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, as indicated by research from five sources. These disruptions underscore the wider impact of the escalating Middle East conflict.
Analysts agree that foreign support for both sides has been key to the continuation and expansion of the civil war. The UAE is the principal enabler of the Colombian mercenary deployment to Sudan, bankrolling and directing the RSF, based on research from five sources. This perspective emphasizes the role of external actors in prolonging the Sudanese conflict.
Key unknowns remain, including what specific evidence, beyond phone tracking and leaked documents, directly links the UAE government to the funding and direction of Colombian mercenaries. It is unclear how many Colombian mercenaries are currently active in Sudan, and what their exact impact is on the military balance between the RSF and the Sudanese army. The identities and roles of key individuals within the transnational network recruiting Colombian mercenaries, beyond the sanctioned Colombians, are not fully known. Additionally, the extent to which other foreign governments, besides the UAE, have provided support to either side in the Sudanese civil war remains uncertain. The current status of the ceasefire announced in April 2026 and its implications for the broader Middle East conflict beyond Sudan are also unclear.