According to the latest opinion poll, 55% of decided voters would vote for Tisza, while Fidesz gets 35%, setting the stage for what is becoming Hungary's most important election since Orbán's current term began in 2010. Polling details show Tisza's lead could translate into a substantial parliamentary majority. The 21 Research Institute estimates that Tisza could have 900,000 more supporters than Fidesz nationwide.
Its calculation suggests that if elections were held this Sunday, Tisza would secure a stable majority with 129 seats in the 199-seat National Assembly, while Fidesz would receive 64 seats and the far-right Our Homeland Movement six. A separate poll by the Medián institute shows Tisza leads 58% to 35% among likely voters with a party preference, and 46% to 30% across the wider population. Medián said Tisza's lead had widened since its previous survey, with the 23-point margin potentially sufficient to deliver a two-thirds parliamentary supermajority.
The institute projected that, if elections were held this Sunday, only two parties — Fidesz and Tisza — would clear the threshold to enter parliament. This challenge comes against the backdrop of Orbán's long political dominance. Viktor Orbán and his party Fidesz have had a stable majority in parliament since 2010, according to analysts.
Led by Péter Magyar, Tisza has maintained a lead over Fidesz in polls since the start of 2025. The nervousness about Hungary's elections is fueled above all by the fact that Orbán is now facing a genuinely dangerous challenger for the first time in years. The election atmosphere is marked by significant concerns about fairness and post-election acceptance.
In Budapest, the discussion is no longer just about whether Orbán's Fidesz party or Péter Magyar's Tisza will win, but also about whether the loser will accept the result and how a change of power would happen in practice. There is fear that the elections will be formally free but practically unfair. There is even more fear about what will happen after the elections.
In such an atmosphere, a situation easily arises where both parties can claim the result is fraudulent if it goes in the wrong direction. Structural obstacles complicate any potential transfer of power, as Orbán has entrenched his authority well beyond the electoral arena. The real problem is not just on election day, but in what Orbán has done throughout his entire 16-year term.
Fidesz has not been content with building support for itself in elections, but has systematically shifted power away from institutions that an ordinary parliamentary majority could easily steer. Key positions have been filled with people loyal to the ruling party for terms significantly longer than electoral cycles — partly even for lifetime appointments. The electoral system has been modified to favor the ruling party, electoral districts have been redrawn, the media landscape has flowed into the hands of the inner circle, and structures supervising the rule of law have been weakened.
The result is a system where changing power through the ballot box is much more difficult than in a normal parliamentary democracy. The European Parliament addressed this situation with unprecedented directness in September 2022, when it adopted a resolution by a vote of 433–123. The resolution stated that Hungary no longer meets the characteristics of a functioning democracy but has become a so-called electoral-autocratic hybrid system — a system where elections are formally held, but real change of power has been made structurally very difficult.
It was the first time in EU history that the union's parliament characterized a member state so directly. The practical effects of the resolution remained limited, but symbolically it meant that Brussels abandoned the delicacy with which Orbán's Hungary had long been treated as a normal, albeit difficult, member state among others. Péter Magyar, the leader of Tisza, brings a unique background as a former Fidesz insider turned challenger.
Magyar left the ruling party Fidesz as recently as 2024. Magyar was politically raised in Fidesz and spent his entire adult life — until two years ago — in Fidesz. Peter Magyar and his newly started party Tisza give many compatriots a feeling they haven't had before.
They believe that this time it will be possible to defeat Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz. Despite the change in leadership, policy continuity on several key issues is expected. Tisza largely thinks like Fidesz on many issues.
They remained silent about the ban on a pride parade in Budapest, do not support EU membership for Ukraine, and vote like Fidesz on important issues about Ukraine in the EU parliament. Magyar says he will not completely break with all of Fidesz's positions. In the election program, it is clearly stated that he is against an accelerated integration of Ukraine into the EU.
He will continue the current non-support. Much of the skepticism towards Ukraine will also continue. Magyar has nonetheless proposed significant changes focused on EU alignment and anti-corruption.
Magyar has promised to make Hungary a 'reliable partner' for the EU and NATO and fight corruption. His election program includes, among other things, meeting the criteria to adopt the euro as currency by 2035 at the latest and joining Hungary to the EU's prosecution cooperation, EPPO. One of Magyar's first goals will be to try to get the EU Commission to pay out multi-billion support to Hungary, which has been frozen due to suspicions of corruption and misuse of EU funds.
His intended new energy minister István Kapitány is tasked with breaking the need for energy from Russia. The international implications of a potential government change are substantial, particularly for Ukraine and EU relations. In that case, out with Prime Minister Orbán and his power party Fidesz — after 16 years in power — and in with 45-year-old Magyar instead.
This is welcomed not least in Ukraine, which expects to finally escape Orbán's blocking of the EU's promised emergency loans of more than 900 billion Swedish kronor. Orbán's strong influence over Hungarian media has shaped public opinion, particularly regarding Ukraine. Orbán's strong control over Hungarian media has contributed to making the country's inhabitants some of the most Ukraine-critical in the EU.
In an independent survey recently, 64% of respondents said they have a negative image of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy — almost as many as think poorly of Russia's Vladimir Putin. Elements of Orbán's legacy would likely persist even under a new government. The country's resistance to the EU's asylum and migration pact is likely to continue.
The name Orbán will also live on in the government, in the form of the intended new foreign minister Anita Orbán. Polling discrepancies reveal different realities among various segments of Hungarian society. Several independent measurements have shown Tisza with a lead, although research institutes close to the government still publish numbers more favorable to Fidesz.
Different camps already partly live in different realities. Significant unknowns remain as the election approaches. It is unclear whether the loser will accept the result and how a change of power would happen in practice.
What will happen after the elections, given fears of potential unrest or disputes over fairness, has not been determined. Whether the elections will be formally free but practically unfair, as feared, remains to be seen. If Tisza wins, the extent of policy shift is uncertain given Magyar's background in Fidesz and similarities on some issues.
Whether the EU Commission will release frozen funds to Hungary if Magyar becomes prime minister is also unknown.