The internet shutdown began shortly after the first US-Israel strikes in late February 2026, with Iranian authorities cutting all access on 28 February, the day the war began. According to monitors, this shutdown is the longest national-scale blackout since the Arab Spring. Netblocks reports the internet shutdown in Iran is the longest in a country ever, at 37 days, though longer shutdowns have occurred but were regional or periodic. North Korea has never been connected to the global internet, according to Netblocks, making Iran's situation unique for a nation with prior widespread connectivity.
Internet connectivity in Iran is at around 1% of normal levels, according to Netblocks, representing a near-total collapse. Most Iranians can only access the National Information Network (NIN), a domestic, government-monitored network separate from the global internet. A large share of connected users in Iran have 'white SIM cards', which are privileged lines with fewer restrictions, according to multiple reports. The NIN offers parallel services like search engines, an Iranian version of Netflix, and messaging apps, multiple reports indicate. According to a report from Miaan Group, domestic platforms on the NIN impose severe censorship, with searches for 'war' or 'ceasefire' yielding no results on the search engine Gerdoo.
The market for selling VPNs and connection 'configs' has surged in Iran due to the internet shutdown, multiple reports indicate. The price of 'configs', which are configuration files for internet connection, has reached between 500,000 to 1 million tomans per gigabyte, approximately £7 to £15, according to multiple reports. According to Hamid, VPN costs have 'skyrocketed' to around £15 ($20) for a gigabyte of data. Internet access through VPNs or special SIMs is being sold for between $6 and $24 a gigabyte, which is 5 to 20 times higher than the global average, multiple reports indicate. Services keeping users connected in Iran no longer function like traditional VPNs but use multiple pathways and communication layers such as DNS tunnelling and HTTPS-based tunnelling. Users of VPNs and configs face risks of fraud, exploitation, and potential surveillance by providers, multiple reports indicate.
Some Iranians are traveling overland to Turkey to connect online, multiple reports indicate. A man on the Iran-Turkey border sells a service using two phones, one Iranian and one Turkish, to facilitate calls between Iranians inside and outside the country, according to multiple reports. According to BBC Persian, this border service costs about £28 ($38) for a four- or five-minute call, including money transfer fees. Calls via such services are patchy, often cutting out after two or three minutes, multiple reports indicate. International calls into Iran are blocked, further isolating the population.
The Iranian regime has made repeated crackdowns on users of Elon Musk-owned satellite network Starlink. According to Amir Rashidi, Iranians inside the country have limited information about the war, relying mainly on state television and one satellite channel. The internet shutdown is part of an effort to shape public opinion through censorship, according to Amir Rashidi. The only news services accessible in Iran are state-controlled, multiple reports indicate. Iran has spent a third of 2026 offline, with 240 hours, or ten full days, of shutdown as of early March, according to Netblocks.
Internet penetration in Iran was 81.7% with 73.1 million internet users and 146.5 million mobile connections as of January 2024, research indicates. Median mobile download speed was 37.36 Mbps and fixed-line broadband was 15.28 Mbps as of May 2024 in Iran, according to research. The expansion of Iran's National Information Network has enabled the regime to deliberately restrict internet access, research indicates. The ICT Ministry under President Ebrahim Raisi prioritized NIN development to reduce dependence on the global internet and limit access to international content, research indicates. The ICT Ministry encouraged migration to NIN by decreasing bandwidth and increasing prices for international internet services, and it received a 25% budget increase in early 2024 to advance the NIN and expand domestic internet, research indicates.
Iranian authorities use DNS spoofing to redirect users trying to visit blocked websites to fake addresses, according to research. Iran's deep packet inspection system acts like a security measure for HTTP filtering, research indicates.
The shutdown cost the economy $35.7 million a day, according to Iranian Minister of Communications Sattar Hashemi. Online sales fell by 80% during the internet shutdown, research indicates. The Tehran Stock Exchange overall index lost 450,000 points over a four-day period, and 130 trillion tomans daily, according to research. The number of financial transactions in Iran dropped by 185 million in January 2026, research indicates. Internet prices increased by 18% in February 2026, bringing the total increase to 52%, research indicates.
Widespread telephone and internet blackouts were reported in Tehran, Isfahan, Lordegan, Abdanan, parts of Shiraz, and Kermanshah, according to research. Iran's National Information Network was fully disconnected, even internally within Iran, research indicates. The blackout was relaxed on 28 January 2026, but severe restrictions remained, research indicates. Following the 28 February Israeli–United States strikes on Iran, there was a renewed 'near total' internet blackout with connectivity dropping to 4% of ordinary levels, research indicates. As of 6 March 2026, internet traffic was measured at about 1% of normal connectivity, and the shutdown entered its 30th day on 29 March 2026, research indicates.
Iran has historically blocked the internet to suppress protests, including in 2019, 2022, and 2025, research indicates. From 2022 to 2024, Iran banned WhatsApp and Google Play during the Mahsa Amini protests, research indicates. Internet shutdowns and filtering are central to the Islamic Republic's control over information flows in Iran, research indicates. During the protests of November 2019, the Iranian government imposed a full six-day internet blackout, research indicates.
Not all Iranians have the technical and economic capacity to use workarounds like VPNs or satellite connections, multiple reports indicate. The blackout prevented protesters from coordinating and documenting regime violence, and created an information vacuum for international observers, according to research. Human rights organisations described the blackout as an attempt by the government to cover up the 2026 Iran massacres.
Starlink began providing satellite internet services in Iran after the Woman, Life, Freedom protests in September 2022, research indicates. The internet blackout initially did not affect satellite internet connections like Starlink, research indicates. There were increased efforts to shut down Starlink and seize satellite dishes during the blackout, research indicates.
The specific technical methods currently being used beyond DNS spoofing and deep packet inspection remain unclear, as do the number of arrests for using circumvention tools like VPNs or Starlink. The exact economic impact on Iran's GDP and daily business operations beyond the reported daily losses is not fully known. The effectiveness of current circumvention methods like VPNs and border services in providing reliable and secure access for ordinary Iranians is uncertain. It is also unclear whether any ongoing diplomatic or international efforts exist to pressure Iran to restore internet access, and what their status might be. According to government spokesperson Fatemeh Mohajerani, efforts were made to provide internet access to individuals who can better convey messages, given certain considerations. According to Doug Madory, Director of Internet Analysis at Kentik, the continued blocking is evidence that the structures of the regime have not changed very much.