Multiple reports indicate talk of a Russian spring offensive, with some claiming it has already begun and others, such as Bloomberg's sources in Moscow, saying it is underway. On the ground, however, the offensive is not noticeable, according to major media. According to Aftonbladet, Johan Norberg, a security policy analyst at the Swedish Defence Research Agency, described the talk of a Russian spring offensive as a chimera, emphasizing that what is important for Russia is to maintain the image of an offensive. He noted there is always talk of an upcoming Russian offensive, such as winter, summer, autumn, Easter, or Christmas offensives, but the interesting thing is that the offensive is always in the future, with no difference seen. Whether a major Russian spring offensive is actually occurring or is merely a narrative tactic remains unclear.
Recent Russian military performance has been mixed, with the Washington-based think tank ISW reporting that Russian forces took virtually no Ukrainian territory in March 2024. It is the first time in two and a half years that Russian forces took virtually no Ukrainian territory in a month, according to major media. The war in Ukraine has revealed five surprises: the full-scale invasion itself; the true state of the Russian armed forces preventing early strategic success; the strength of Ukrainian resistance and ability to adapt; Western resilience in support for Kyiv; and direct and material North Korean support for the defense of Russian territory, according to research. Russia is not immune to its own biases, with Russian leaders isolated from free flow of information during Covid, misjudging the real state of the Russian armed forces due to corruption and lack of honest reporting, and underappreciating the ability and will of Ukraine and the West to resist aggression, research indicates.
The talk of a Russian spring offensive is a chimera.
Russian forces appear to be intensifying the tempo of their offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast while decreasing the rate of attacks in northern Kharkiv Oblast, according to research. Russian offensive operations in Kharkiv Oblast are primarily intended to fix and distract Ukrainian forces to allow intensification elsewhere in theater, research suggests. Russian forces increased the intensity of assaults in the Toretsk-Horlivka direction on the night of June 18 and maintained a relatively high rate of attacks between June 19 to June 22, reportedly making several tactical gains, research shows. Russian forces have been generally inactive on the Toretsk-Horlivka sector throughout 2024 until their recent activation and intensification, according to research.
Territorial gains in 2024 are subject to conflicting estimates, with the Russian army capturing 2,064 square kilometres of Ukrainian territory from February 2024 through the end of October 2024, according to the OSINT project WarMapper cited in research. From early August 2024 onward, 68% of total territorial gains by the Russian army (more than 1,500 square kilometres, per WarMapper) or 60% (2,360 square kilometres, per Meduza) were achieved, research indicates. Russian gains were the result of Russia's active use of powerful guided bombs, poor quality of Ukrainian fortifications, and tactical changes leveraging manpower and weaponry advantages, according to military analysts interviewed by The New York Times and cited in research. The exact amount of Ukrainian territory captured by Russian forces in 2024 remains uncertain due to conflicting estimates from different sources.
What is important for Russia is to maintain the image of an offensive.
Since late 2023, the Russian side has consistently applied pressure on multiple sections of the front, stretching Ukrainian forces thin, research shows. In October 2024, the Russian army captured the city of Selydove and the fortress city of Vuhledar, according to research. Russia continues to exert significant pressure on Kurakhove, the capture of which would allow encircling Pokrovsk from the flanks, research indicates. Seizing Pokrovsk and aligning the front line in western Donetsk Oblast remain key objectives of Russia's offensive, according to research.
Ukrainian sources have confirmed that some Ukrainian forces have redeployed units to the Kharkiv direction from Donetsk Oblast, research shows. The United States formally asked Ukraine for help defeating Iranian drones after Iran responded to a U.S. and Israel attack with over 500 ballistic missiles and approximately 2,000 unmanned aerial systems in the first five days, according to US Central Command cited in research. American air defences struggled with the volume of cheap, slow-moving Shahed-type drones, resulting in a strike in Kuwait that killed six American servicemembers and damage to the US Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain, research indicates. The Washington Post reported on 5 March 2026 that both the United States and its Middle Eastern allies had approached Ukraine seeking expertise and practical support in countering Iranian drones, according to research.
There is always talk of an upcoming Russian offensive, such as winter, summer, autumn, Easter, or Christmas offensives.
Zelenskyy confirmed Ukraine would provide assistance, directed officials to present options, and announced Ukrainian specialists and technology would be deployed to the region, offering to send drone interceptors in exchange for Patriot air defence missiles, research shows. Iran has supplied an estimated 5,000 to 10,000 Shahed drones to Russia since 2022, with Russia also producing modified variants (the Geran) domestically, according to research. This highlights the global implications of drone warfare, as conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East intersect through technology transfers and military cooperation.
Russia's behavior is inconsistent with stated intentions but consistent with its stated vision, as Vladimir Putin had proclaimed 'the fundamental unity of the Ukrainian and Russian people' in July 2021 and Russia had mobilized a large invasion force, research indicates. Russia still maintains the strategic objective of bringing about the subjugation of Ukraine and believes it is winning, with surrender terms including Ukraine ceding territory already under Russian control along with Kharkiv and possibly Odessa, agreeing not to join NATO, and maintaining a head of state approved by Russia, according to research. Russia's process to achieve subjugation is in three stages: continuing pressure to drain Ukrainian munitions and reserves; breaking resolve of Ukraine's international partners to limit military aid; and initiating further offensive operations to force capitulation by 2026, research shows.
The interesting thing is that the offensive is always in the future, but no difference is seen.
The Russian military began 2023 with approximately 360,000 troops in Ukraine, rising to 410,000 by June 2023, and established training regiments and standardized units after the Wagner mutiny, according to research. This buildup reflects Russia's commitment to a prolonged conflict, despite challenges in achieving decisive breakthroughs on the battlefield.
Peace negotiations are deadlocked over land, with Ukraine refusing to cede to Russian demands to relinquish remaining parts of Donbas, research indicates. Zelenskyy has said the US was pressuring Ukraine to make concessions to bring a quick end to the conflict, which has fallen below Iran in Washington's priorities since US and Israel attacks on Tehran, according to research. The specific terms and timeline for potential peace negotiations between Ukraine and Russia remain unclear, given deadlocked talks over land.
Russia cannot decide on the battlefield with its own resources, or it would have done so long ago.
Many Western leaders and analysts were 'blinded by bias' and preferred taking Putin at his word, despite existing precedents like the concentration of Iraqi forces near Kuwait in 1990, research shows. A report by the FT says Trump threatened to stop supplying weapons for Ukraine to pressure European allies to help reopen the Strait of Hormuz, leading to a statement by countries including the UK, France, and Germany expressing readiness to contribute to safe passage efforts, according to research. Russia carried out a rare daytime drone attack on Ukraine, killing four people in the Cherkasy region and damaging energy infrastructure and industrial facilities in the west, launching more than 360 drones, research indicates. The future level of Western military aid to Ukraine is uncertain, amid reports of U.S. pressure and shifting priorities.
In Kirkenes, Norway, the regional counterintelligence chief noted eight Russian fishing trawlers docked, including the fish-processing vessel Arka-33, which had docked weeks earlier and hadn't left, with concerns about espionage due to Russian government declarations that commercial vessels could be co-opted by the military, research shows. Locals in Kirkenes noticed that Russian fishermen were younger than before the war and sometimes did physical-training exercises on deck, according to research. The extent of espionage activities by Russian commercial vessels in regions like Kirkenes, Norway, is not fully known.
The war has gone badly for Russia.
Zelenskyy praised 'positive' fresh talks with US mediators including special envoy Steve Witkoff, Jared Kushner, and Senator Lindsey Graham, agreeing to strengthen a document outlining US security guarantees for any future peace deal, research indicates. This diplomatic development suggests ongoing efforts to secure international support, even as military operations continue to shape the conflict's trajectory.
Russia cannot just end the war, due to domestic political and possibly other reasons.
What Russia can do is prolong the time and hope that support for Ukraine decreases and the West becomes uninterested or split.
During that time, while chewing on, it is important to maintain the image of a constant offensive, both to influence the West and to give a picture at home that things are moving forward.
Looking at the map, it has not changed much since the end of 2022.
Practically, as the war looks now, it would require lots of armored vehicles for that type of significant offensive, but as soon as they gather near the front, they are shot to pieces.
Instead, Russia is forced to advance with infantry that gets shot to pieces when they take ten meters before they fall.
That is also an offensive in some sense, but not the big decisive offensive.